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Beyond the Trade and
Technology Council: National
security concerns are changing
how policymakers view the
global economy
The  policymakers  overseeing  globalisation  are  facing  a  new  range  of  national
security  and  resilience  pressures  that  are  fundamentally  reshaping  how  they
interact with a globalised private sector.
The  inaugural  meeting  of  the  EU–US  Trade  and  Technology  Council  (TTC)  on  28
September  was  marked  by  transatlantic  drama  over  AUKUS  (https://www.epc.eu
/en/Publications/EU-crash-course-in-geopolitics-Navigating-the-transatlantic-
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mine�eld~426030), the trilateral defence partnership between Australia, the UK and the
US.  But  its  �rst  communique  (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail
/en/STATEMENT_21_4951) met more muted reactions, as it is long on areas for discussion
and future cooperation and short on concrete deliverables.
Whether  its  working  groups  deliver  on  its  promise  of  reinvigorated  transatlantic
relationship or follow the ignominious fate of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC)
will become clearer at its next meeting. However, in its language and topics of focus, the
TTC  (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/The-EU-US-Trade-and-Technology-
Council~41c008)  is  illustrative  of  a  broader  shift  in  the  relationship  between
most governments and the global economic system, driven by the combined impact of
COVID-19,  the  rise  of  great  power  competition  and  renewed  domestic  turn  towards
industrial  policy  (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/Updating-the-European-industrial-
strategy-for-the-post-pandemic-world~3d1c88).  
The de-abstraction of the global economy 
In past trade and economic discussions, governments have focused on setting framework
conditions and then stepping back to allow the private sector to build supply chains and
allocate resources as it saw �t. There was full con�dence in the aggregate e�ciency of
their decentralised decision-making. 
Previous ill-fated rounds of  transatlantic  negotiations –  the TEC and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – focused on regulatory alignment (perhaps the
most symbolic dispute being over chlorinated chicken standards (https://www.gmfus.org
/news/rebuilding-strategy-transatlantic-economic-relationship)).  With  the  exception  of
relatively circumscribed areas, such as the military and security industrial establishment,
as far as the policymakers who oversaw the global economy were concerned, the supply
chains that resulted from such agreements and crisscrossed national boundaries in a
�nely  segmented  international  division  of  labour  were  abstracted  into  aggregate
economic data.  
What  is  noteworthy  in  the  TTC  communique  (https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_4951)  is  the attention to  the concrete workings
and geographical locations of speci�c supply chains and other private sector activities,
and the implication that they may have to be actively managed to ensure “security and
resilience”. The communique pledges to “increase transparency of supply and demand;
map respective existing sectoral capabilities; exchange information on policy measures
and research and development priorities, and cooperate on strategies to promote supply
chain resilience and diversi�cation.” 
This mirrors domestic e�orts in both the EU (https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-
2019-2024/europe-�t-digital-age/european-industrial-strategy/depth-reviews-strategic-
areas-europes-interests_en)  and  the  US  (https://www.whitehouse.gov/brie�ng-
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room/presidential-actions/2021/02/24/executive-order-on-americas-supply-chains/)  to
come to grips with the intricate and globalised network of supply chains in the midst of
the pandemic when bottlenecks arose (and persist) in every conceivable section of said
chains, and frantic public e�orts were made (https://www.piie.com/publications/working-
papers/how-covid-19-vaccine-supply-chains-emerged-midst-pandemic)  to  scale  up
vaccine  production.  In  tandem,  as  part  of  its  growing  geopolitical  competition  with
China, the US leveraged (https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/how-united-
states-marched-semiconductor-industry-its-trade-war-china)  its  control  and  in�uence
over key sections of the semiconductor supply chain (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications
/Chips-on-our-shoulder-Is-Europe-neglecting-design-in-its-semiconducto~3c341c) to deny
Beijing  access  to  advanced  technologies.  This  brought  into  plain  view  how  speci�c
technological and economic interlinkages could become vulnerabilities. The sinews of the
global economy have been decidedly ‘de-abstracted’. 
The changing relationship between policymakers and the globalised private sector 
It  is  far  from clear  whether  the TTC heralds  some dirigiste  turn.  There are domestic
moves towards more interventionist industrial policies on both sides of the Atlantic, but
these  are  by  no  means  uncontested  internally  (https://www.politico.eu/article/eus-
industrial-policy-stalls-before-take-o�/).  Even if  the TTC discussions bear fruit,  one can
also conceive a range of interventions, from the relatively free market, such as expanding
bilateral trade agreements to facilitate diversi�cation, to the dirigiste.  
Nevertheless, the TTC text illustrates how policymakers are changing how they analyse,
conceptualise, seek knowledge of, and interact with a globalised private economy. Even
mapping speci�c supply chains is a challenging task that involves reshaping governments’
relations with the private sector, as the White House is learning in its struggles to extract
their desired information from semiconductor companies. “I  don’t want to have to do
anything compulsory but if they don’t comply, then they’ll  leave me no choice,” in the
telling  words  of  US  Commerce  Secretary  Gina  Raimondo  (https://www.ft.com/content
/7bd59b60-c53d-4796-93f4-d0f51c2b5066).  
Other  examples  of  the  changing  relationship  include   the  communique’s  pledge
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_4951)
to   “develop  a  common  vision  and  roadmap”  for  6G  technology.  Technological
development that has up till now been �rmly in the hands of multinational companies in
consortia  like  3GPP  (https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-
breakthrough
/#:~:text=Erdal%20Arikan%20was%20born%20in,against%20a%20career%20in%20medicine.)
(with substantial  and much commented on contributions from Chinese companies)   is
now a question for intergovernmental negotiations.  
The same can be said for international technology standard-setting (https://eu.boell.org
/en/2020/03/03/technical-standardisation-china-and-future-international-order),  where
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both  EU  (https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/The-strategic-importance-of-
Europe~37f244) and US governments have historically been content to give the private
sector  free  rein.  But  they  now  pledge  in  the  TTC  (https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_21_4951)  to  develop  “both  formal  and  informal
cooperation mechanisms to share information regarding technical proposals in speci�ed
technology  areas  and  seek  opportunities  to  coordinate  on  international  standards




share_key=f799c37a85af7a5986306e9972c9a36d)).  Export  controls  and  investment
screening – the focus of two TTC working groups – are other important areas that require
more intrusive monitoring of private sector activities.  Although  more traditional tools,
they have signi�cantly grown (https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/export-
controls-americas-other-national-security-threat)  in  importance  (https://www.csis.org
/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/recent-developments-eu-foreign-investment-
screening) over the past few years.  
All in all, the contrasts between the TTIP’s and TEC’s approach and focus are marked. If




date=2021-10-04)’  of   international  economics  is  shifting  how  the  global  economy  is
conceptualised and monitored. In practice, the shift is likely to go further. Brian Dees, the
US National Economic Council Director, stated recently (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org
/commentary/transcript/the-biden-white-house-plan-for-a-new-us-industrial-policy/),
“Our private sector and public policy approach to domestic production prioritized low,
short-term costs over security, sustainability, and resilience. [COVID-19] was the wake-up
call.” Beyond questions of security and resilience, the demands of the green transition –
which require the wholesale restructuring of entire economic sectors – may also start to
require greater attention to the speci�c ways the global economy is structured.  
Beyond the Trade and Technology Council
Whether the TTC will result in substantial joint initiates remains to be seen. The EU and
the  US  also  have  clearly  di�ering  geopolitical  stances   that  could  hamper  substantial
agreement.  Case  in  point,  contrast  Jake  Sullivan  and  Kurt  M.  Cambell’s  thoughts
(https://www.foreigna�airs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-
catastrophe)  on  Washington’s  long-term technological  competition  with  China  against
Sabine  Weyand’s  recent  defence  (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCEesvAbjaQ&
list=PLlTvrj3vDtgpTMDgU8e4PObrsPPsjJHE9&index=16&t=517s) of trade policy’s ability to
tie China into an updated rules-based order. 
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However, even if the TTC discussions do not yield bilateral action in these �elds, the US is
likely to continue unilateral action as well as its e�orts to build similar partnerships in the
Indo-Paci�c  (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-paci�c/quad-countries-agree-secure-
microchip-supply-chains-media-2021-09-18/). China, meanwhile, has been forthright in its
vision  (https://epc.eu/en/Publications/Chinas-grand-industrial-strategy-and-what-it-
means-for-Europe~3ded84) for supply chain and technological security. 
The EU seeks to operationalise open strategic autonomy in the face of this growing power
competition, not to mention future climate change-related disruptions to supply chains
(https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/could-climate-
become-the-weak-link-in-your-supply-chain),  a  disruptive  and  competitive  green
transition  (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank
/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_ATA%282021%29696181)  and  likely  future
pandemics  (https://www.cgdev.org/blog/the-next-pandemic-could-come-soon-and-be-
deadlier).  This  goes  beyond  EU-US  relations.  At  a  recent  EPC  event  (https://youtu.be
/SaIhMuOc7M4?t=3060), the Korean Trade Minister highlighted the need for the EU and
Korea to establish a “dialogue channel” to “discuss and troubleshoot issues or problems
arising in our supply chains”. Even if the Union continues its e�orts to preserve the global
rules-based   and   liberal  market  order,  these  pressures  make  escaping  the  trend  of
monitoring the global economy in much greater and disaggregated detail unlikely.
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